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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-0O0CENTURIAN CORPORATION,

)

Plaintiff--Respondent, )
Case No. 14583

VS.

FIBERCHEM,, INC.,
Def endant--Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondent Centurian Corporation (.referred
to hereinafter as "plaintiff") brought this action alleging
breach, by non-delivery, of an agreement for the purchase and
sale of goods.

Defendant-Respondent Fiberchem, Inc. (referred

to hereinafter as "defendant") denied the making of the contract
and asserted the defense of alter ego, alleging that the check
delivered to it was for payment on the account of plaintiff's
alter ego corporation, Centurian Custom Boats, Inc.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court for the Third Judicial District in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Stewart

M. Hanson presiding, granted plaintiff judgment in the
amount of $3,3 00.00 together with interest and costs. Defendant's defense of alter ego was held inapplicable, and
its counterclaim was dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an order of this Court vacating and
reversing the judgment rendered by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 1, 1973, plaintiff Centurian Corporation
delivered to defendant a check in the amount of $3,3 00.00.
Plaintiff alleged, and through its president, Richard Nickles,
testified that the check was issued to defendant for the purchase of raw materials used in its boat manufacturing operation.
Defendant denied the existence of a contract for the
purchase and sale of goods; and through Fred Schwab, its
branch manager, testified that the check was in payment of
sums due defendant by Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and was
intended by plaintiff as such.
Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. was organized under the
laws of the State of Utah in October of 1968 (R. 106, Ex.
11-D)•

From the time of its organization until its involun-

tary dissolution in 1974, Richard Nickles and his wife Margaret Nickles were the sole shareholders, two of the three
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directors and the primary officers of the company (Ex. 11-D).
Plaintiff Centurian Corporation was organized under the laws
of the State of Utah approximately nine months later, in
August of 1969.

Richard Nickles and his wife Margaret, to-

gether with her father, William Kaiser, were the sole shareholders from the time of incorporation through the period
material to this cause.

Mr. and Mrs. Nickles served at all

material times as two of the three directors, and served as
the primary executive officers of the corporation (Ex. 12-D).
Commencing some time in late 1968 or early 1969, the
defendant, a wholesaler in materials used in boat manufacturing, sold raw materials to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc.

This

relationship between Fiberchem, Inc. as a supplier of raw materials and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and/or Centurian
Corporation as purchasers existed until November of 1973 when
Centurian Corporation made its last purchase.
Plaintiff maintains that it purchased no raw materials from defendant until the litigated transaction of August
1, 1973, and that all prior purchases were made by Centurian
Custom Boats, Inc.

Both plaintiff and defendant, however,

maintained a flimsy and often inconsistent regard for the
separation of the corporations as evidenced by invoices for
materials designated at one time Centurian Corporation and at
other times Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. (Exs. 23-25-D).

The

statement of accounts was maintained by defendant in the name
-3-

of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., although defendant was not
aware until the filing of this action that two corporations
actually existed.
While it was contested below as to which corporation
was actually purchasing the raw materials, the destruction
of the boat manufacturing facility at 620 Wilmington Avenue,
Salt Lake City, in January of 1972, brought an end to all
purchases for a period of one year (Ex. 8-P).
As of July 13, 1973, Centurian Custom Boats, Inc.
owed to defendant the sum of $3,313.15 on open account for
the purchase of raw materials, primarily resins, coatings and
fiberglass mats (Ex. 8-P). On August 1, 1973, plaintiff Centurian Corporation issued defendant a check in the amount of
$3,3 00.00 which defendant applied to the account of Centurian
Custom Boats, Inc. to extinguish a long delinquent account
(Ex. 8-P). Plaintiff, through Richard Nickles, testified
that the check was issued for the purchase of raw materials
which were never delivered by defendant.

In November of 1973,

notwithstanding the failure of delivery on the alleged August
1 transaction, plaintiff purchased raw materials from defendant totalling $851.95 (Ex. 5-P) on a C.O.D. basis and issued
its check.

On January 25, 1974, plaintiff made vague demand

on defendant, presumably for the delivery of the goods specified in the August 1, 1973 transaction, although its written
demand does not specify the goods in question (Ex. 13-D).
-4-

ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO
PLAINTIFF AND IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE
OF ALTER EGO.
This case involves the believability of witnesses,
one produced by the plaintiff, Richard Nickles, and one by
the defendant, Fred Schwab.

The variances in testimony are

so disparate as to cast grave doubt on the veracity of one
or the other.

But this matter exceeds the formal believabil-

ity of either on the question of whether a discussion took
place forming a contract, but goes further and involves the
conduct, actions and activities of two corporations, Centurian
Corporation and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., both controlled
by Richard Nickles.

If, on the record and as a consequence

of the trial court's findings that a contract was made, this
Court cannot infringe the providence of the trier of fact,
then the issue of alter ego and offset can be applied.

That

is that defendant has an admitted offset in the amount of
$3,300.00 against Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., which corporation is the alter ego of plaintiff and must be offset against
any sum due the plaintiff.
The trial court's judgment for plaintiff was grounded
on three principal findings:

(1) that a contract existed

between plaintiff and defendant for the purchase and sale of
-5-

goods; (2) that the contract was breached by defendant's
failure to deliver those goods; and (3) that defendant, because of the grounds specified by the trial court in its
memorandum decision (R. 55), could not assert a defense of
alter ego and corresponding offset.
Defendant, throughout the proceedings below, denied
the making of the August 1, 1973 contract for the purchase
and sale of goods and presented substantial evidence that Centurian Corporation and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. were for
all practical purposes the same entity, the corresponding
alter ego of each.

The trial court concluded the inapplica-

bility of the alter ego defense on four grounds which are
either erroneous conclusions of law or irrelevant matters
bearing on the legal issues of its defense.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND NO EVIDENCE

OF TRICKERY OR FRAUD AND FURTHER ERRONEOUSLY HELD
THAT DEFENDANT MUST ESTABLISH TRICKERY OR FRAUD IN
ORDER TO ASSERT A DEFENSE OF ALTER EGO.
There is substantial evidence in the record to demonstrate that plaintiff, by and through Richard Nickles, its
chief executive officer, has, since its inception, used the
two corporate entities, Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and Centurian Corporation to avoid creditors, liability, and in general to protect its assets.

There is substantial evidence to

demonstrate that plaintiff has engaged in a course of conduct
-6-

calculated to avoid the payment of the debt due defendant
through the manipulation of the two corporations,
Centurian Corporation asserted throughout the trial
below that prior to the fire which destroyed its Wilmington
manufacturing plant in January of 1912,

it purchased no goods

or materials from defendant, since it was only a holding company which either held real estate or purchased molds which
it leased to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc.

Richard Nickles

testified, although no documentary evidence was introduced,
that corporate formalities were maintained by the corporations,
The record of this case, together with the record of two other
proceedings involving Centurian Corporation, shows that in
fact Nickles represents the relationship between the corporations to suit the purposes of the particular case, and in
this case his purpose was to defeat a just obligation that was
owed to defendant*
Nickles testified that Centurian Corporation was organized to hold real estate in 1969 (R. 111) and that in 1970
it purchased molds from third parties ana leased those molds
to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. (R. 112). All leases between the companies were lost in a fire in January, 1972, although Nickles testified that Centurian Corporation maintained
its offices at his home located elsewhere.

Nickles further

testified that Centurian Corporation did not manufacture,
produce or own boats, that it bought no raw materials from
-7-

defendant at any time prior to August 1, 1973.

In short,

Centurian Corporation had no dealings with defendant.
In another action, Scantlin v. Centurian Corporation, the record of which was admitted in this action as
Exhibit 16-D, Nickles testified that Centurian Corporation
in fact produced 85 to 90 boats in 1971 (Nickles deposition
at 11, Ex. 16-D), and that Centurian Custom Boats manufactured no boats in 1971 but only acted as the sales agent for
Centurian Corporation.

At the trial below Nickles explained

this contradiction by saying that the reporter in the Scantlin
case got the two companies mixed up, "an easy thing to do"
(R. 131).
In proceedings in the Federal District Court for the
District of Utah, Central Division, (Centurian Corporation v.
Transwestern General Agency, Civ. No. C--263, 1973), Centurian
Corporation brought an action against its insurance carriers
for the destruction of the manufacturing plant at 62 0 Wilmington and its contents (R. 120-128).

The affidavit of

Richard Nickles (Ex. 15-D) in support of Centurian Corporation's claim states that from August of 1969 until the fire
in January of 197 2, Centurian Corporation manufactured boats.
No mention is made of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. made no claim for insurance proceeds.

In the complaint filed in that proceeding (Ex. 22-D),

plaintiff attached as an exhibit its accounts payable through
-8-

September 30, 1971, and detailed on the exhibit is a balance owing to defendant in the amount of $4,191.05 for purchase of raw materials, which sums correspond to sum detailed
on defendant's statement to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc.
(Ex. 8-P) . Again, neither Nickles nor his wife could make
any satisfactory explanation of the contradictions of the
testimony at this trial and the affidavits filed in the federal court proceeding, but said in effect that their lawyers
and accountant were confused (R. 133). At the very least,
however, plaintiff's exhibit to its complaint (Ex. 22-D) constitutes an admission of liability to defendant for the purchases, for which the $3,300.00 was paid.
Defendant would also refer the Court to Ex. 20-D, an
additional affidavit made by Nickles in the federal court action, wherein a detailed list of the material lost in the
fire is attached.

Again, Centurian Corporation is shown as

the owner of materials used in the manufacture of boats. The
contradiction between the testimony of Nickles at the trial
in this matter and the other proceedings is striking and cannot be resolved, except that on one or more occasions the
testimony was inaccurate.
With respect to plaintiff's dealings with defendant,
the record below makes clear the following:
A.

Invoices were labeled both Centurian Corporation

and Centurian Boats, Inc. and were received without objection
-9-

or request for clarification by plaintiff (Exs. 23-25-D).
B.

Defendant received at least one check drawn on

the account of Centurian Corporation paying for purchases of
raw materials (Ex. 18-D) prior to the fire in January, 1972.
C.

Fred Schwab, branch manager of defendant, did

not know of the existence of the two corporations and assumed
that he was dealing with one entity (R. 185).
D.

Richard Nickles admitted that confusion often

resulted from the similarity of the names of the two companies (R. 131).
This Court, in the case of Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc.,
26 Utah 2d 88, 485 P.2d 667 (1971), held that one corporation
was the alter ego of another and enforced a wage claim
against the parent corporation incurred by its subsidiary.
This Court stated that it would disregard the corporate fiction without a showing of fraud or trickery when considerations
of justice so required.

At page 670 of the Omnico decision,

this Court stated:
In this situation the consideration of
justice which so requires is simply that a
controlling corporation such as Omnico should
not be permitted to manage and operate a business from which it stands to gain whatever
profit may be made, have the advantage of the
efforts of those who serve it, and then use
the nomenclature of another corporation as a
facade to insulate it from responsibility for
paying for such services.
While plaintiff Centurian Corporation is not the parent of
Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., the similarities to Omnico are
-10-

striking since there is common ownership!, benefit and control of both corporations.
Nickles testified, as did his wife Margaret, in explanation of checks written to defendant prior to January,
197 2, that Centurian Corporation would commonly make loans
to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc.

However, plaintiff intro-

duced nothing at the trial to demonstrate the formalities of
loans, promissory notes, ledger entries or minutes.

Conven-

iently, all such records were destroyed in the fire (R. 146).
Nickles also testified that Centurian Corporation
was the financing arm of Centurian Custom Boats in that it
held the molds and leased them to Custom Boats (R. 154-55).
If that is true, all the assets of the operation, together
with the insurance proceeds were left in the plaintiff Centurian Corporation and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. was left
as a bankrupt and dissolved corporate shell, the result of
which is that defendant, like the wage claimant in Omnico,
would be left with a useless judgment.
The trial court, while admitting and hearing the evidence, held that the Omnico decision required evidence of
fraud or trickery which it found to be absent in this action.
The Omnico decision does not so require, but requires a merger of corporate identity resulting in injustice to creditors.
Defendant met that burden at trial.
The trial court found and held as a bar to defendant's
-11-

claim of alter ego and course of dealing defendant's knowledge that Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. had ceased doing
business as of January, 1972.

This finding is irrelevant

to the issues of the lawsuit.

Fred Schwab testified that

he was not aware two corporations were in existence.
The equitable doctrine of alter ego, or the piercing of the corporate veil, was developed very early by the
courts to combat abuses of corporations.

The disregard of

corporate status is transactional; that is, it does not operate to dissolve the corporation, rather it binds either a
shareholder or another corporation to its acts.

The remedy

is equitable and therefore both a trial court and appellate
court have great latitude and discretion in finding fact and
formulating a remedy.

See Fletcher, Corporations (Perm. Ed.)

§ 41 et seq.; O'Neal, Close Corporations (Perm. Ed.) I 1 et
seq.; 46 ALR 3d 428.
This Court is not unfamiliar with the equitable doctrine and has decided a number of cases dealing with the disregard of corporateness or alter ego.

While the Omnico de-

cision, supra, is the nearest in point, the cases of Omoss v.
Bennion, 18 Utah 2d 251, 420 P,2d 47 (1966); Stine v. Girola,
9 Utah 2d 22, 337 P.2d 62 (1959); Western Securities Co. v.
Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 P. 856 (1923) look at the transaction
course of dealing involved and do not require fraud or trickery nor hold the aggrieved party to duties arising, if at all
-12-

at law, but not in equity.
In Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, supra, the defendant in an action to recover on notes, asserted that the
plaintiff corporation was the alter ego of its sole
holder.

share-

The trial court agreed, and this Court affirmed.

The evidence adduced at that trial showed that the shareholder used the corporation for his personal business and
commingled assets and funds.

The opinion of the court speaks

not in terms of fraud or trickery but in terms of real party
in interest as disregarding the corporate entity.
The trial court below, by its denial of the defense
ignores the equitable nature of the relief requested and the
conduct of the parties, and in particular the perfidious use
of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. by the plaintiff.

Defendant

can find no cases or statutory authority supporting the proposition that it had a duty to ascertain the existence of two
corporations.

The thrust of the equitable doctrine of alter

ego and piercing corporate veils is that of the conduct of
the parties, the real intent, the real party in interest and
in doing equity.
II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT A CONTRACT WAS
ENTERED INTO FOR THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF GOODS
FOR WHICH THE CHECK WAS CONSIDERATION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
-13-

The trial court found that a contract for the purchase and sale of raw materials in the amount of $3,300.00
was made by and between plaintiff and defendant.

Richard

Nickles testified that after the fire which destroyed the
manufacturing operation conducted by Centurian Custom Boats,
Inc., Centurian Corporation decided to enter that business
and engage in manufacturing.

Notably that was after Centur-

ian Corporation filed a claim for all the proceeds under the
fire insurance policies.

In any event, he alleged he con-

tacted Fred Schwab regarding the purchase, and a decision
was made as to prices and commodities.

The only evidence

aside from the testimony of Nickles is the check voucher produced at the trial by plaintiff containing a list of goods
adding up to approximately $3,300.00, a coincidental figure
with what was owed to defendant.

Nickles testified that af-

ter a period of time he brought the action for defendant's
failure to deliver.
Fred Schwab, the branch manager at Fiberchem, tells
an entirely different version.

Schwab testified that from the

time of the fire until July of 1973, he made every reasonable
attempt to collect the $3,300.00 owed by Centurian Custom
Boats to defendant.

Schwab stated that due to the reported

fire and financial difficulties described by Nickles, the
head office finally decided to give up collection attempts as
fruitless and write the debt off.
-14-

Schwab, just prior to August 1, 1973, had renewed
conversations with Nickles regarding the debt.

Nickles

told Schwab that he would pay the debt if Schwab would "dummy an invoice" (R. 183). This Schwab refused to do.

Nickles

finally acquiesced, and on August 1, 1973, delivered a check
to defendant's office.

Schwab testified that there was

no

discussion of materials and the check was payment on account.
As far as he knew, Centurian Corporation manufactured the Centurian Boat and there was one business.

Nickles' testimony

when laid against Schwab's is either believable or it is not.
Both cannot be truthful in their testimony.

Apparently in

the face of constant impeachment, Richard Nickles' prior conviction for felonious mail fraud tR. 14(^) , the trial court
chose to believe Nickles.
Defendant elsewhere at the trial1 demonstrated that
Nickles not only had motive to hide the truth, but the means
by which Nickles utilized the corporations not only in this
action but in the prior actions as well.i These are harsh
words, but deliberately chosen.

Defendant is well aware of

the scope of review this Court may exercise in reviewing the
findings of the trial court but must urge that the testimony
of Richard Nickles was riddled with inconsistencies both
internally and when viewed against his prior testimony, to
which defendant has directed the Court's attention.

There

can be no balance or harmony struck between the testimony of
-15-

the two men.

The trial court, in view of the record in this

matter, found the making of the contract erroneously.
CONCLUSION
Defendant is entitled to an order of this Court vacating the judgment reached herein and for whatever further
relief or proceedings this Court deems proper.

Michael F. Hey^^fid
225 South Second East
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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